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Toward Greater Certainty in Water Rights? Public
Interests Require Inherent "Uncertainty" to Support
Constitutional Governance of Our State's Waters
Michael Warburton*
I. WAS THE COMMISSION ON THE RIGHT TRACK? THE NEED FOR AN
INSTITUTIONAL RECONNAISSANCE THAT RECOGNIZES DIFFERENT
PERSPECTIVES TO FIND OUT WHICH PROBLEMS WE ARE TRYING
TO SOLVE WITH "GREATER CERTAINTY"
The Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law
devoted an entire chapter of its 1978 Final Report to the problems caused by
"uncertainty" in property rights in California's waters.' The Final Report
concluded that this uncertainty "inhibits investment and encourages litigation."2
The Commission proposed legislative reforms that would better quantify existing
water rights, give the holders enhanced legal protections and enable them to treat
their usufructs more like ordinary private property.3 But water rights have always
been a special sort of property with more limitations and associated responsibilities
than experienced elsewhere and benefits that have never been exclusively assigned.4
Claims of private ownership and public interests in water have long combined to
create zones of uncertainty where courts have settled disputes. The way these zones
are defined and managed by our legal institutions influences any attempt to increase
"certainty" in any rights.
In fact, our approaches to "uncertainty" ultimately define the character and goals
of our water management enterprise. The strategic suggestions which emerge from
the following analysis start with a basic recognition that water management will
always be perceived from many different vantage points, and in our democratic
political context and western cultural tradition, each of these is entitled to the
credibility that can be accorded within legal, scientific, and cultural limits.
* Executive Director, Public Trust Alliance, an organization devoted to advocating use of the public
trust doctrine in resource development controversies and assisting communities as they request more
responsible conduct from their trustees; Member, Steering Committee for the Environmental Justice Coalition
for Water; Member, Public Advisory Committee supporting the Department of Water Resources in writing the
2003 Update of the California Water Plan (advocating environmental justice and public trust perspectives);
Former Member, Scientific Staff at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in
Laxenburg, Austria. J.D., 1992, Boalt Hall Law School, University of California at Berkeley.
1. See generally GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL
REPORT 16-49 (Dec. 1978) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
2. Id. at 12.
3. See generally Nirav K. Desai, Up a Creek: An Introduction to the Commission's Final Report
Discussion of Uncertainty in California Water Rights Law, 36 McGEORGE L. REv. 29 (2005) (detailing the
Commission's recommendations on achieving greater certainty in water rights).
4. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. X, §§ 2, 5 (stating that reasonable and beneficial use does not include
waste, and that all uses of appropriated water are public uses subject to public regulation, respectively).
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"Certainty" and "uncertainty" are intimately entwined in any understanding of these
limits, and with the ultimate decisions about who gets how much water and under
what terms.
The very question of whose problems are being solved by increasing
"certainty" in property rights is at the heart of many water disputes. While some
aspects of these complex challenges might be addressed through better definition
and enforcement of private claims, other governance concerns depend on better
recognition of the public sphere and the concurrent maintenance of the zones of
"uncertainty" where physical arrangements can be negotiated and values and
interests can be balanced. A careful survey of history gives us the tools to
identify marginal zones5 and to encourage appropriate public and institutional
action at strategic points to shape adaptations that will best serve present as well
as future generations.
The legal definition and treatment of water rights has produced a history
characterized by anything but "certainty" and punctuated by some profound
changes leading up to our present circumstances. 6 We are currently experiencing
a situation where public discourse and decision making can be influenced by
grossly asymmetric commitments of resources. It is also increasingly common
for concentrations of private economic interest to overwhelm the public process.7
In the water rights context, demands for greater certainty have largely come from
holders of private rights who want to expand the scope of their options and
reduce regulatory oversight. When these demands are, introduced into grossly
over-allocated systems like most of California,8 greater certainty in private water
rights can often only be gained at the expense of less zealously defended public
interests in governance, future interests in economic development, the public
health of vulnerable communities, or the condition of our natural environment.
Several of the zones where impacts of expanded private rights are felt have
been theoretically conceived as involving rights of a "constitutional" dimension,
5. Emphasis on the "marginal" nature of these zones is crucial for maintaining longer term systemic
stability; core values and historic commitments are not necessarily being challenged at these points, but
opportunities for adaptive action can indeed be found when proposals for new uses are made at the "margin"
enabling a public weighing of values involved at a particular place and deciding whether a particular change
should be made at a given time for the benefit of the larger system.
6. Perhaps one of the best illustrations is the shift from the "natural flow" doctrine, entitling riparian
land owners to the natural flow of the stream, "undiminished in quality or quantity," to the more modem notion
of "reasonable use" of a correlative share with other riparian claimants. The new concept in interpreting riparian
rights came as changing technologies made water useful as a source of industrial energy. The transition was
rationalized in the so called "mill cases" when affected riparians sought compensation for the installation of
dams and mill races on "their" streams. See generally JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER
RESOURCES (3d ed. 2000).
7. One commonly perceived reaction has been increasing social momentum for political campaign
reform.
8. Ellen Hanak, Who Should be Allowed to Sell Water in California? Third Party Issues and the Water
Market, in PUB. POL'Y INST. OF CAL. 1, 9 (2003) (quoting the State Water Resources Control Board Water
Rights Division estimates of three times as many rights as there is actual water in California, but even these
estimates do not include Native American claims or many dormant rights).
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or interpreted as inherent responsibilities of institutions that are the successors or
agents of historic sovereigns. We know that states have obligations to all their
inhabitants to ensure that trust resources will be available for use by future
generations and that certain public uses of water resources have always received
enhanced protection in the laws of civilized societies. 9 This means that efforts to
"reduce uncertainty" for private rights holders can sometimes appear to others as
disguised attempts to wrest water and wealth from the public commonwealth for
exclusive private benefit. This is a result inimical to historic democratic traditions.
The Governor's Commission was engaged in a sensitive task: functioning
within a viable political consensus and making proposals that would serve the
best interests of the broader public, while at the same time encouraging the
participation of influential private parties who have become accustomed to a
certain style of business. Narrow private interests have an enormous stake in the
outcome of any broad policy implementation, and historically, advocates for
these interests have not restrained themselves in flexing their influence.' 0 The
ambition for "certainty" in water rights from these historic players is of legendary
proportion in the history of modern water regulation. There is absolutely no
doubt that they, as well as more recent entrants into California water markets,
would like to become accustomed to more certainty in the treatment of an
expanded concept of their water rights."
Very good institutional reasons explain why almost none of the Commission's
suggested legislative reforms were enacted, even as some of its strategic observations
were indeed later reflected in decisions by courts and boards enforcing water rights.
The mixed results indicate relative concentrations of political and economic
influence at different levels of government in California. They also reflect the
varying degree of knowledge, ignorance, apathy, interest, and even political stamina
among diverse communities that form the California public. Instead of functioning
always as an institutional form intended to facilitate positive action, many know that
a key function of California's legislative institutions is also to prevent harmful
legislation from being enacted that might undermine fundamental democratic values.
Expanded enforcement of private rights in water frequently bumps up against
constitutional protections of public interests. In short, some aspects of the lack of
9. See generally HELEN F. ALTHAUS, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, PUBLIC TRUST RIGHTS (1978); PUTTING
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK: THE APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO THE
MANAGEMENT OF LANDS, WATERS AND LIVING RESOURCES OF THE COASTAL STATES (David C. Slade et al.
eds., 2d ed. 1997) (summarizing the public trust doctrine); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471,474 (1970).
10. For recounted stories, see generally GRAY BRECHIN, IMPERIAL SAN FRANCISCO: URBAN POWER,
EARTHLY RUIN (1999); REMI A. NADEAU, THE WATER SEEKERS (4th ed. 1997); MARC REISNER, CADILLAC
DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER (1986); DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF
EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY, AND THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1985).
11. Some point to the lack of an "ENRON" crisis in California water markets as partly due to the
decision of the ENRON subsidiary, AZURIX, to withdraw from water banking projects due to their perception
that they would not be able to gain enough "certainty" in property rights for them to undertake business in the
style they envisioned.
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follow-through on the Commission's suggestions can be explained by the
structural need for a certain level of uncertainty to co-exist with private claims.
This uncertainty opens and gives ultimate effectiveness to the zones of
negotiation where private claims interface with historic public interests.
When transactions are proposed on these margins, our laws require public
institutions to inquire whether the transactions are consistent with long-term
public interests. These inquiries can provide the deliberative space to enable our
society and the natural environment to co-evolve within more responsible limits.
We certainly do not want to keep approving patterns of development that
cumulatively undermine the viability of our natural resource systems. The failure
to make inquiries on the margins tends to result in increasingly brittle systems.
While short-term economic gains have indeed been made in certain patterns of
development, the cumulative tendency of these independent efforts seems to take
us in the direction of systemic brittleness. Pleas for increasingly "streamlined"
regulation involving more "certain" water rights will tend to take us faster along
this path. Conversely, preservation of structural uncertainty in marginal zones
keeps us asking the questions we need to ask to support transformations toward
more socially and ecologically sustainable patterns of development.
II. SOURCES OF "UNCERTAINTY" IN WATER RIGHTS
Most of the problems identified by the Commission are even more acute and
urgent today than they were during the drought-induced investigation of 1978.
Private water rights holders continue their attempts to capture more benefits in
more "uncertain" zones of their private property claims. The State, in turn, is
managing the tensions arising from the combination of broad demands for
environmental protection, preservation of agricultural capability, and assurance
of adequate' water supplies for possibly 12 increasing water demands from a
growing population and sprawling development in a changing economy.3 Over-
appropriation of water, which "didn't matter" in times past because downstream
users often found adequate supplies for their uses despite exaggerated claims by
senior appropriators, is becoming increasingly controversial. More appropriators
want to transfer their "conserved" water to remote users who can pay them more
revenue than their own use might generate. These new opportunities for water
marketing are generating additional incentives to exaggerate historic use to
establish the broadest possible benchmarks for private claimants.
12. The word "possibly" is used because there are substantial opportunities for using less water than is
currently used for accomplishing the same functions in all sectors of water use. See, e.g., PETER H. GLEICK ET
AL., PAC. INST., WASTE NOT, WANT NOT: THE POTENTIAL FOR URBAN WATER CONSERVATION IN CALIFORNIA
(2003) (discussing potentials of urban conservation).
13. See, e.g., 4 DEP'T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN-UPDATE 2004, ADVISORY
COMMITrEE REVIEW DRAFT (2004), available at http://www.waterplan.water.ca.gov/bl60/workgroups/chapter
reviewgroup.htm (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (concerning the process and text in the
emerging 2005 update with input from an active Public Advisory Committee).
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Problems of quantification and exaggeration that seemed difficult in the past
are becoming ever greater challenges in the current policy environment devoted
mainly to finding solutions to structural challenges through market transactions
with transferable rights. 14 This is where "certainty" becomes more of a problem
because buyers and sellers need to have reconcilable perceptions of just what
they are buying and selling. Yet, at the same time, the original legal basis and the
associated limits of legitimate expectations of what water rights might entitle an
owner to do is also coming under increasing public scrutiny. As suggested in
other contexts, vastly different policy approaches are appropriate in situations
where "the problem contains some uncertainty" as opposed to those where "the
uncertainty contains the problem."' 5 The introduction of broad marketability of
water rights in California, at a time when such rights are over-allocated and
insufficiently quantified, has created the latter type of situation. Both scientific
and legal policies will probably have to adjust to accommodate this changed
context.
On top of the institutional pressures, the state's natural hydrologic patterns are
far from stable in the face of accelerating climate change. Patterns of natural
hydrology, formerly assumed to be a reasonably stable background, are no longer
even predictable on a credible basis. While the Commission's analysis of uncertainty
in property rights in water listed a number of institutional challenges,' 6 the physical
setting of water itself did not appear to be a major factor in that analysis. However,
current science tells us that climate and other factors influencing California's
hydrology make it more difficult than many believe to predict how much water will
actually be present in what form at any given time in the future. The natural setting
for water is extremely variable in California, with precipitation and runoff
concentrated in short time periods mostly in the northern part of the state while
human. demands are much more evenly distributed throughout the year and most
often concentrated geographically in more arid zones far to the south. A great deal of
14. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 109 (West Supp. 2004) (specifying the need for certainty in private
rights and a policy to support and facilitate voluntary transfers of those rights).
15. Such a distinction in management approaches (suggesting that under conditions of extreme scientific
uncertainty, "the institutions are the facts" and uncertainty should be embraced rather than reduced) was
proposed for appropriate management of a perceived social-environmental crisis concerning the deforestation of
the Himalayan Foothills. See generally MICHAEL THOMPSON ET AL., UNCERTAINTY ON A HIMALAYAN SCALE:
AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL PERCEPTION AND A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR THE
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HIMALAYA (1986); Michael Thompson & Michael Warburton, Decision
Making Under Contradictory Certainties: How to Save the Himalayas When You Can't Find Out What's Wrong
With Them, 12 J. APPLIED SYS. ANALYSIS 3 (Apr. 1985); Michael Thompson & Michael Warburton, Knowing
Where to Hit It: A Conceptual Framework for the Sustainable Development of the Himalaya, 5 MOUNTAIN RES.
& DEV. 203 (1985); Michael Thompson & Michael Warburton, Uncertainty on a Himalayan Scale, 5
MOUNTAIN RES. & DEV. 115 (1985).
16. See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 17-25. Concerning sources of uncertainty, the report
emphasized the tendency of private claimants to exaggerate at every level of the appropriation process,
unquantified rights including dormant municipal rights to future use and the 1928 Amendment to the California
Constitution, Article X, Section 2, the effect of which was described "to cast a shadow over questionably
reasonable uses of water." Id. at 21.
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public concern, therefore, is concentrated on the practicability of maintaining and
supporting the extensive storage and conveyance infrastructure that makes California
lifestyles possible.
At the time of the Commission's Final Report, the basic tensions between the
fluctuating natural basis of California water and a property rights system that
places great value on predictability were never explicitly confronted. Indeed, the
essential function of water in sustaining human life was barely mentioned. The
notion that a global movement might arise positing that a basic level of access to
clean water is actually a human right 17 was not even a blip on anyone's radar
screen. Instead, the Report acknowledged that the era of trying to solve basic
allocation challenges through the construction of a publicly subsidized storage
and conveyance infrastructure was probably coming to an end, and that more
locally and regionally crafted solutions emphasizing conservation and reuse
would have to be pursued. This approach seems to be the one adopted in drafts of
the current update of the California Water Plan. 18 This basic premise also supports
the Commission's position that the current priority structure incorporated in existing
water rights provides a viable starting point for sharing natural shortages, and that no
revision of rights is needed. A basic argument here is that continued viability of this
water rights system requires increasing attention to public interests in both the water
itself and the decision making processes regarding its use and allocation.
On the institutional side, the context for water rights has always posed
some uncertainty because water rights are usufruct, relating only to its use
and not to the ultimate ownership of the object in question. The California
Constitution, Water Code, and common law are quite clear on this point.' 9
Just as in the case of human labor, where what is being bought and sold is
17. The links between access to safe water, alleviation of poverty, and economic development have long
been a focus for discussion at the United Nations. See, e.g., U.N., REPORT OF THE WORLD SUMMIT ON
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, at 20-37, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20, U.N. Sales No. E.03.U.A.1 (2002),
available at http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/documents/summit_docs/ 31302_wssd-report-reissued.
pdf (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (relating to the achievement of the Millennium Development
goal on Safe Drinking Water); see also Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Right to Water, U.N. ESCOR, 29th Sess., Agenda Item
3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (2002), available at http://www.intemationalwaterlaw.org/IntlDocsIUNCECSR-
General-Comment-rightto_water.pdf (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review); VANDANA SHIVA,
WATER WARS: PRIVATIZATION, POLLUTION, AND PROFIT (2002); Robyn Stein, SA New Democratic Water
Legislation: National Government's Role as Public Trustee in Dam Building and Management Activities, World
Commission on Dams (1999-2000), at http://www.dams.org/kbase/submissionslshowsub.php?rec=INSl14
(copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (detailing the water provisions in South Africa's post-apartheid
Constitution and public trust legislation).
18. But see Dan Walters, Comprehensive Water Plan Crucial to California's Future, OAKLAND TRIB., May
18, 2004, at L7 (reporting a higher level agency commitment to storage and conveyance solutions and adjustments
to the draft plan by the new Administration despite long involvement and contrary recommendations of public
advisory committee).
19. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art X, § 2; CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1971) (stating that "[a]ll water
within the State is the property of the people of the State, but the right to the use of water may be acquired by
appropriation in the manner provided by law").
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constantly under negotiation, 20 there is an analogous zone of negotiation when
water use is transferred, and here the bounds are historically relative as well,
and constrained by legal convention.
Instead of recognizing the wisdom of the 1928 Amendment to the California
Constitution for its embrace of uncertainty, the Commission stated that:
[T]he effect of the Amendment has been to cast a shadow over questionably
reasonable uses of water. With increased demand for water in general,
changing ideas of what is reasonable, and the vagaries of climate and other
factors involved in the ad hoc determination of reasonable use, the shadow
of uncertainty may envelop increasing numbers of water uses.2'
The idea that structural uncertainty is required for effective constitutional
governance of our water system arises from a perspective where "uncertainty" is a
positive thing in its own right, and not just a meddlesome characteristic to be reduced
whenever possible. In some ways, what appears as "urcertainty" to the holders of
private rights might be alternatively conceived as the public space into which private
property rights intrude and, when pushed far enough, a point is reached where public
institutions spring back to limit or redefine the private "right." This conception of
uncertainty comprehends the inherent tensions and contradictory perspectives needed
to maintain the public credibility of our constitutional system of checks and balances.
It actually allows opposing perspectives to exist within a "single" institutional
setting.
From this vantage point, the appropriate policy objective is better defined as trying
to develop rules and presumptions tailored first to preserving essential uncertainty and
then to strategies for practical functioning within it. Rather than engaging in a narrowly
conceived quest to reduce "uncertainty" in generalized application to private property
rights in the state's waters, a more useful approach might be to embrace "uncertainty"
as an inherent aspect of our evolving constitutional system of governance and to figure
out ways to manage it more constructively.22
111. WAS THE COMMISSION'S VIEw Too NARROW?
From the very beginning, the Commission chose to exclude a number of
broad categories of analysis that some might consider highly relevant to any
discussion of water rights in the state. These categories were: 1) the federal
20. The transition between legally sanctioned human slavery, where one could indeed buy the entire
person, and the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution happened in a very brief time
period. Boundaries regarding employers' and employees' contributions to healthcare maintenance and other
aspects of life support and relative interests in work product are indications that private interests in hired labor
are still very much under negotiation.
21. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.
22. An analogous management approach was suggested for constructive intervention in a perceived
deforestation crisis in the Himalayan Foothills. See supra note 15.
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aspects of rights (presumably including Native claims); 2) the particular
functions of, and inter-relationships among, the water agencies that shape and
enforce public policies; 3) contracts with, and management of, the major federal
and state water storage and conveyance projects; and 4) the statutory protections
23for areas of origin to guard options for future development in those areas.
Without consideration of these aspects of California water rights, the Commission's
starting perspective was narrow indeed. An added problem was the Commission's
failure to note several important cases in its Final Report as it evaluated existing law.
Less than five years after publication of the Commission's Report, the California
Supreme Court in National Audubon Society v. Superior Cour described one of the
omitted cases, which ruled that hydraulic mining constituted a public nuisance when
the spoils illegally blocked navigation on public rivers,25 as "one of the epochal
decisions of California history, a signpost which marked the transition from a mining
economy to one predominantly commercial and agricultural. 26 This statement was,
of course, made in the case formally recognizing the integration of the public trust
doctrine and the prior appropriation system as concurrent aspects of California water
rights law.27 The Commission's deliberately narrow approach precluded discussion
of the evolutionary role that protection of public interests plays at the margin in
helping our society adapt to changing patterns of economic growth. It made it
difficult for the Commission to even consider the factors that induced the Mono Lake
litigation in the first place and that later sustained citizen advocacy in the face of
misplaced political insistence that California's "business-as-usual" be preserved.The cases omitted by the Commission Report and later cited by the California
Supreme Court rationalized economic transition after judicial notice that the state's
former primary industry was indeed a nuisance. These rulings opened the path for
agriculture and other industry and commerce to replace mining as the leading
economic engines for the development of the state.28
The Commission introduced its uncertainty discussion by noting that, "[f]or the
individual and society together, property is the means for harnessing and utilizing
resources.... Certainty gives the security of knowing what one has and what one can
do with it. It allows planning and rational investment."
29
23. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
24. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
25. People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 4 P. 1152 (Cal. 1884). On the federal level, just as in the
Civil Rights movement much later, the recognition of public rights under conditions subject to considerable
political and economic influence at the state level required additional impetus from Federal authority. See
Woodruff v. N. Bloomfield Mining Co., 18 F. 753 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884).
26. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 720.
27. Id.
28. Though, from an ecological perspective, industrial agriculture's capital and chemical-intensive
technologies and alliance with real estate development interests exerted forces that have closely paralleled the
impacts of the mining industry which it replaced. See also ROBERT DAWSON & GRAY BRECHIN, FAREWELL,
PROMISED LAND: WALKING FROM THE CALIFORNIA DREAM 51-80 (1999).
29. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 16.
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The Commission recognized that benefits associated with marketable rights
included facilitating "the rational choices and calculated risks whereby present
wealth joins labor to produce new wealth, ' 30 but it failed to develop analogous
discussion of cases where markets demonstrated inabilities to protect fundamental
public values. Many commentators have expertly chronicled historic legal limitations
on private rights in California waters.31 The legal protection of public trust interests,
in contrast to the enforcement of private claims, involves a long history of
recognition that market prices rarely reflect fundamental long term public values and
so a different set of criteria, not dominated by recognition of mere "economic use,"
32must be applied to these particularly important resources. Indeed, the concept of
prior appropriation could only take root in a context where public limitations on the
extent of the claims were explicitly acknowledged. These usufructs were not blank
checks handed from the public purse to private actors. But, instead of acknowledging
the existence of this network of limitations, the Commission endorsed an approach
focusing on better quantification of private rights, which many actors knew might
develop in a manner largely blind to the existence of public values in water and the
historic legal protections that have evolved since before the founding of our republic
to protect them.
IV. POINTS OF ATTENUATION OF PRIVATE INTERESTS
Most acknowledge that in order to realize the social benefits of property, we
want to approach a situation where both buyers and sellers have a similar
understanding of what is being bought and sold. This makes informed economic
transactions possible and opens the way to gains in efficiency. But this should not
be accomplished at the expense of historic public rights. Many can see points of
attenuation of private property rights where the exercise of those rights infringes
on the liberties of other private actors. But in the water world, because of public
interests in water uses, dimensions of health and community self-sufficiency are
simultaneously implicated in proposals to change relative allocations or even in
the acts of diverting or transporting water.
The relative merits of private claims to water always have to be weighed
against a range of other interests. Perhaps the great master of the common law,
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., expressed the legal challenges best when he wrote
for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1908 decision of Hudson County Water Co. v.
30. Id. However, the presumptions inherent in this familiar assertion of an association between the
mechanics of market forces and their connection to economic growth have been recently contested on the basis
of archaeological evidence and the problems of reconciling this with modem economic theory. See DAVID A.
WARBURTON, MACROECONOMICS FROM THE BEGINNING: THE GENERAL THEORY, ANCIENT MARKETS, AND THE
RATE OF INTEREST 1-34 (2003).
31. See, e.g., Brian E. Gray, The Property Right in Water, 9 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1
(2002) (describing the reasonable use doctrine and public trust doctrine as historical limits on private rights in
water).
32. See, e.g., City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980).
2005 / Toward Greater Certainty in Water Rights?
McCarter 3 to resolve a controversy over a proposal by a water company to
export water from New Jersey to New York:
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme. Yet
all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are
other than those on which the particular right is founded, and which become
strong enough to hold their own when a certain point is reached. The limits
set to property by other public interests present themselves as a branch of
what is called the police power of the State. The boundary at which the
conflicting interests balance cannot be determined by any general formula in
advance, but points in the line, or helping to establish it, are fixed by
decisions that this or that concrete case falls on the nearer or farther side.34
This is actually the substance of much public trust doctrine jurisprudence,35
where a major concern is identifying points where public management decisions
actually convert public domain to private use or surrender too much public control
over inherently public functions or resources to private parties.36 In addition to the
public trust doctrine, several other legal doctrines with roots in public values are
commonly acknowledged to place limits on private appropriation of water. The
choice of the Commission to adopt such a narrow lens with which to evaluate
"uncertainty" in California water rights is politically understandable, but could never
provide the degree of social consensus needed to adjust actual behavior. The
Commission's narrow perspective certainly did not include additional areas explored
in Justice Holmes' further description of public interests implicated in the Hudson
County case noting that:
[Flew public interests are more obvious, indisputable and independent of
particular theory than the interest of the public of a State to maintain the
rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by such
drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit for the
purpose of turning them to a more perfect use. This public interest is
omnipresent wherever there is a State, and grows more pressing as
population grows. It is fundamental, and we are of opinion that the private
property of riparian proprietors cannot be supposed to have deeper roots....
The private right to appropriate is subject not only to the rights of lower
owners but to the initial limitation that it may not substantially diminish one
of the great foundations of public welfare and health.
37
33. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
34. Id. at 355.
35. See, e.g., 111. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
36. See generally Sax, supra note 9.
37. Hudson County Water Co., 209 U.S. at 356.
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Despite later critical treatment on individual dimensions of the Hudson
County decision, the essential analysis of legal rights and public interests
involved remain compelling. With this ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court firmly
recognized the existence of a fundamental, protected public space upon which
private property claims might intrude, but which any State could and should
preserve and protect by virtue of its sovereignty and its trust relationships with its
inhabitants and their natural environment. The public interests to be protected
were not just relics of ancient sovereign prerogative; they could take on a number
of different forms and Justice Holmes realized that a legitimate discussion could
not take place solely in terms of the private rights involved. In the case before the
Supreme Court, Justice Holmes went on to deal with exactly the sorts of issues
that are challenging State governance of water resources in California today,
particularly in the face of efforts to expand the marketability and transferability
of water and water rights. Although subsequently refined in other cases, these
additional fragments from that historic case might also serve as signposts for a
more comprehensive analysis of water rights and allocation strategies:
One whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot
remove them from the power of the State by making a contract about
them. The contract will carry with it the infirmity of the subject matter.
But the contract, the execution of which is sought to be prevented here,
was illegal when it was made.
38
And further:
A man cannot acquire a right to property by his desire to use it in
commerce among the States. Neither can he enlarge his otherwise limited
and qualified right to the same end.. . . It constantly is necessary to
reconcile and to adjust different constitutional principles, each of which
would be entitled to possession of the disputed ground but for the
presence of the others, as we already have said that it is necessary to
reconcile and to adjust different principles of the common law.39
The conclusion of this last passage was a perfect forecast for the California
Supreme Court's position seventy-five years later in recognizing the integration
of the common law public trust doctrine and the prior appropriation systems in
California water rights law.40 In the National Audubon case, the Court
commented:
As we have seen, the public trust doctrine and the appropriative water
rights system administered by the Water Board developed independently
38. Id. at 357 (citations omitted).
39. Id.
40. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
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of each other. Each developed comprehensive rules and principles which,
if applied to the full extent of their scope, would occupy the field of
allocation of stream waters to the exclusion of any competing system of
legal thought.41
The opposing parties in National Audubon laid out possible extreme
arguments that either the public trust doctrine or the prior appropriation system
defined the water rights decision space.42 But in shaping a framework that might
support a constructive public consensus, the California Supreme Court came to
the following resolution:
We are unable to accept either position. In our opinion, both the public trust
doctrine and the water rights system embody important precepts which make
the law more responsive to the diverse needs and interests involved in the
planning and allocation of water resources. To embrace one system of
thought and reject the other would lead to an unbalanced structure, one
which would either decry as a breach of trust appropriations essential to the
economic development of this state, or deny any duty to protect or even
consider the values promoted by the public trust. Therefore, seeking an
accommodation which will make use of the pertinent principles of both the
public trust doctrine and the appropriative water rights system, and drawing
upon the history of the public trust and the water rights system, the body of
judicial precedent, and the views of expert commentators, we reach the
following conclusions.43
The Court went on to outline a set of precepts (particularly noting a continuing
duty of supervision by trustees and acknowledging their ability to revisit prior
allocations and change them in light of current circumstances) that provided guidelines
for solving the Mono Lake controversy. 44 The significant success of water conservation
strategies and public education programs during a ten year advocacy push led to a
landmark decision of the State Water Resources Control Board ("SWRCB") to
maintain the surface level of Mono Lake at a higher level and for Los Angeles to
release its claim to much of the water that it had claimed by right.45 In the time since
the National Audubon decision, the political removal of several California Supreme
Court justices and the reassertion of similar constellations of political influence to those
that shaped the Commission's original analysis have contributed to a situation where
familiar questions are again on the table for additional consideration and negotiation.
41. Id. at 726-27.
42. Id. at 727.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 727-28.
45. See S.W.R.C.B. Decision 1631, at 194-96 (Sept. 28, 1994). The appropriation and allocation of
millions of dollars to support conservation programs and alternative water resources also contributed to
smoothing the path toward this decision.
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A point of interest is to note some history that brought the Mono Lake case to the
court in the first place. A footnote in the National Audubon opinion describes
SWRCB action bearing on the "uncertainty" in water rights presently under
discussion:
In 1974 the [SWRCB] confirmed that [the Department of Water and Power]
had perfected its appropriative right by the actual taking and beneficial use
of water, and issued two permanent licenses (board licenses Nos. 10191 and
10192) authorizing DWP to divert up to 167,000 acre-feet annually (far
more than the average annual flow) from Lee Vining, Walker, Parker and
Rush Creeks. The Water Board viewed this action as a ministerial action,
based on the 1940 decision, and held no hearings on the matter.46
This footnote matter-of-factly recounts that perfected state water licenses
were being granted in 1974 for "far more than the annual average flow" of creeks
that also supplied other users, all on a ministerial basis with no hearings
whatsoever, and that the action was based on findings generated by a process that
never even considered the public interests in the subject water. Apparently,
neither SWRCB procedures nor general public understanding were sufficient to
classify this as any sort of problem at the time. Yet now, even as we know that
numerous "rights" were established through similarly questionable processes, we
still do not have a reliable or credible set of procedures to truly engage and
evaluate the equities and uncertainties for anything like permanent solutions. The
Governor's Commission's descriptions of confused courts dealing with decades
of litigation over rights describing entitlements to flows many times what could
be found in nature are not only relics of the distant past;47 these circumstances are
very much with us today in quantifying rights in both groundwater basins and
interconnected surface flows.
V. THE MORE THINGS CHANGE, THE MORE THEY REMAIN THE SAME
The water rights situation in California since the resolution of the Mono Lake
controversy reminds us that the same challenges and incentives that led to the
Hudson County controversy in New Jersey in 1908 are very much with us today
and will probably remain so for quite some time to come. The tension between
the demand for certainty in private rights to encourage efficiency and the
structural need for "uncertainty" to preserve public options at the interface of
private rights and public values will indeed shape our responses as long as our
economic system fosters incentives of private risk and reward. It is simply part of
the structural territory. New Jersey had enacted a statute in 1905 to protect its
46. Nat'lAudubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 714 n.8.
47. See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 22-25.
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own development options from the private ambitions of water exporters
48
(somewhat analogous to area of origin statutes enacted in California prior to the
construction of the State Water Project), and the U.S. Supreme Court laid out
boundaries for private conduct. Legislation and jurisprudence in California have
created similarly motivated limitations on private water rights in the form of the
reasonable use doctrine and state water policy set forth in Article X, Section 2 of
the California Constitution and in the various forms of the public trust doctrine.49
Yet private actors still advance proposals and plans that seem deliberately
designed to stretch the envelope as far as they can in the direction of their private
interests, without respect or regard for these venerable principles of public law.
In mid December of 2002, the California Coastal Commission discussed a
proposal by Alaska Water Exports to extract water from the mouths of the Gualala
and Albion Rivers and deliver it in huge plastic bladders pulled by tugboats for a fee
to San Diego and other growing coastal communities.50 The argument appeared to be
exactly parallel to the Hudson County Water Company's argument in maintaining
that "surplus water" was available for private appropriation at that point. In the
modern case, numerous public advocates called attention to the State's public trust
interests in the water to support fisheries and other ecological and scenic values in the
coastal zone beyond the mouth of the river. 1 This meant the water was already
committed to supporting public values beyond those ordinarily considered by the
Water Rights Division of the SWRCB.
In addition, the advocates raised questions about whether any "disputes" that
would arise after the launch of such a program might be pre-empted by international
trade tribunals (unaccountable to the local electorate) if it was determined that the
water could be classified as "in commerce" at the point after it was diverted for the
purpose of sale.52 Local authorities would lose jurisdiction, and with it, any power to
regulate the situation, even if it might include conditions threatening the health and
safety of the local population.53 This situation potentially poses a challenge
concerning the improper alienation of public supervision similar to those that
prompted the Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois5 4 ruling by the U.S. Supreme
Court more than a hundred years before. The recognition of the diversion of water
for the purpose of sale as a "beneficial" use remains a challenging legal question as
48. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349,353 (1908) (citing 1905 N.J. Laws ch. 238, at 461).
49. See generally Gray, supra note 31.
50. Pamela J. Podger, Coastal Panel Rejects Plan to Tow River Water: Private Firm Would Have
Supplied San Diego with Mendocino County Resource, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 14, 2002, at A17.
51. See, e.g., Ruth Caplan & Nancy Price, Statement by the Alliance for Democracy for the Public
Hearing of the California Coastal Commission, ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY, Dec. 13, 2002 (copy on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (comments regarding diversion of water from the Gualala and Albion Rivers); see
also Podger, supra note 50 (describing objections of "[clommunity leaders, environmentalists and public trust
advocates").
52. Caplan & Price, supra note 51, at4.
53. See id.
54. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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yet inadequately discussed or publicly understood with respect to its implications in
the context of current trade regulations. The Gualala-Albion proposal was withdrawn
before it could be challenged by the inevitable litigation that would have been filed if
the proponents had persevered. But the same proposal by the same company has
emerged again, this time with respect to the Mad River, a little further to the north.55
Other cases in California have paralleled the "contracts" aspect of the Hudson
County case of 1908. Justice Holmes was of the opinion then that:
One whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot
remove them from the power of the State by making a contract about
them.... A man cannot acquire a right to property by his desire to use it in
commerce among the States. Neither can he enlarge his otherwise limited
and qualified right to the same end.56
Yet, this is exactly what many agencies and individuals are attempting to do in
relation to water supplied and transported in California's main storage and
conveyance projects. A major claim has been that water described in contracts
related to a fully constructed State Water Project ("SWP") constitutes "entitlement"
to actual water. When parts of the originally envisioned project were never built
because of lack of public support, many people referred to quantities in excess of
actual project capacity as "paper water," but most people were not troubled because
there was usually enough water to do what most contractors wanted to do. However,
as time passed and pressures on water supplies tightened, there was increased
incentive for contractors to market their contracts as if they reflected real water. A
few county planning departments and others long engaged in California real estate
development and compliant bureaucracies determined that business could proceed as
usual (without regard to pesky details such as non-existent water). Behind closed
doors, a few project contractors and water agencies came to an agreement that
essentially rewrote provisions of the law related to the apportionment of "shortages"
and substituted their own pact, which came to be known as the "Monterey
Agreement." 57 Several groups united in an effort to challenge this action in court.
58
In the autumn of 2000, the California Court of Appeals for the Third District
explained paper water, stating that:
Paper water always was an illusion. "Entitlements" is a misnomer, for
contractors surely cannot be entitled to water nature refuses to provide or the
body politic refuses to harvest, store, and deliver. Paper water represents the
unfulfilled dreams of those who, steeped in the water culture of the 1960's,
55. Friends of the Gualala River, Davidge Withdraws Waterbag Applications!, at http://www.gualala
river.org/export/default.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2005) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
56. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908).
57. See California Water Impact Network, The Monterey Agreement, The State Water Project Contracts
(SWP)-The Kern Fan Element (Feb. 2004) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
58. See Planning & Conservation League v. Dep't of Water Res., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 173 (Ct. App. 2000).
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created the expectation that 4.23 maf of water could be delivered by a SWP
built to capacity.59
The Court also rejected an Environmental Impact Report on implementation
of the Monterey Agreement because the purported "lead agency" was much more
an interested party than a public decision maker. 60 Even though the contractors
and agencies carried on business as they had for years, somehow, this time, the
court reflected the strained public credibility engendered by customary action in
61the water world. It remains to be seen if the words in the Court's opinion will
actually affect behavior in the rarefied world of California water, but the idea that
public interests in water and its allocation are a public matter that reaches the
very roots of our democratic system of governance was again given credence.
The challenge and appeals were brilliantly crafted under provisions of the
California Environmental Quality Act. 2 A procedural maneuver called a "reverse
validation cause of action" was successfully employed to question the legitimacy
of the transfer of title to an additional part of the Kern Water Bank.63 This is the
controversial private enterprise to store and transfer water from underground
storage near the terminus of the SWP.64 In one of the most important court
decisions since National Audubon, public interests in planning and governance
again became part of the water debate.
Most often, when actions are taken asserting private water rights, there is a
noticeable lack of resistance at points where one would guess public interests
might be defended. Perhaps due to a lack of public understanding or political
will, the agencies established to supervise water rights simply avoid this part of
their job as they tend to other pressing duties in their permitting and project
approval departments. This is apparently the case as publicly subsidized
irrigation water is applied to fields containing toxic levels of selenium
65contamination. It is well known that the runoff from such fields causes genetic
damage and death to wildlife and also grievously contaminates drinking water
supplies anywhere downstream. 66 Often, as was the case at Kesterson National
Wildlife Refuge, contamination is known to exist before the construction of a
federal water project 67 and there is an understanding that contractors would be
responsible for any damaging impacts-but a responsible inquiry has never been
59. Id. at 190 n.7.
60. Id. at 184-85.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 182-83.
63. Id. at 182.
64. See JOHN GIBLER, PUB. CITIZEN, WATER HEIST: How CORPORATIONS ARE CASHING IN ON
CALIFORNIA'S WATER (Dec. 2003); see also supra note 41 and accompanying text.
65. See generally Felix E. Smith, The Kesterson Effect: Reasonable Use of Water and the Public Trust,
6 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 45 (1996)
66. See id. at 45-48, 59.
67. See id. at 46-47.
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made as to whether it is actually reasonable and in the public interest to continue
the application of water to these lands.
In some cases, excessive compensation has been paid to particular
landowners to take especially dangerous lands out of "production. 68 This
compensation has been paid on the basis of appraisals that compare these lands to
"prime" agricultural land, even though it would have been practically worthless
without the public water that was seemingly unreasonably applied to it. Such
situations are commonplace in the world of California agriculture and real estate
development where many fortunes have been created and magnified with the
addition of publicly subsidized water. But they are becoming more difficult to
justify to an increasingly skeptical public.
Another area where the private exercise of water rights is intruding on publicly
protected space is in cases where politically and economically vulnerable communities
are forced to bear a disproportionate share of the negative health, environmental, and
economic burdens suffered as a consequence of the implementation of public
policies-a fundamental cause of the modem environmental justice movement. There
has been clear recognition of unfair impacts on both federal 69 and state70 levels and a
growing commitment to see that they are mitigated at early stages of planning for
any significant public actions. Two particularly important environmental justice
concerns are the very predictable health, economic, and cultural impacts of water
transfers negotiated mainly between buyers and sellers of private water rights,
and impacts of toxic contamination on subsistence fishers who depend on public
fisheries as an important source of food.
In the case of water transfers, a wide range of the public is affected not only
because new activities and uses are possible in areas receiving water, but impacts
are inevitably broader than those likely to be considered by water rights holders
or cash-strapped public servants in counties of origin. Sometimes whole communities
and their agricultural economies depend on traditional uses of water for that purpose.
The situation can be easily distinguished from the case of an industrial plant
closure because water is naturally seen as a kind of "capital asset" of the source
area itself that is being mined, not merely shaped into wealth through the efforts
68. See Firebaugh Canal Co. v. United States, 203 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2000) (recounting the settlement
filed in partial resolution of the extensive conflict). But see id. at 597 (Trott, J., dissenting) (setting forth what
appears to be a more publicly compelling analysis and conclusion). See also Lloyd G. Carter, How I See It:
Westlands Escapades, 12 ESTUARY 4 (2003), available at http://www.estuarynewsletter.com/2003_02/sfep-
2003_02.pdf (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
69. See Exec. Order No. 12898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1994), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321
(West 2003 & Supp. 2004) (entitled "Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations
and Low-Income Populations" and enacted to supplement and sharpen longstanding constitutional obligations).
70. 1991 Cal. Stat. ch. 690 (establishing the Office of Planning and Research as coordinating agency for
California environmental justice programs and mandated that individual agencies promulgate their own respective
policies); see, e.g., CAL. STATE LANDS COMM'N, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE PoucY (Oct. 2002), available at
http./www.slc.ca.gov/Policy%2Statements/Env -Justice/Environmental%20Justice%20Policy% 20Fmal%20Web.pdf
(last visited Nov. 12, 2004) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (finding environmental justice obligations
consistent with Public Trust responsibilities owed to all Californians, adopted October 1, 2002).
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of an entrepreneur. Once it is gone and there are people depending on it
elsewhere, it becomes far more difficult for the source area to recapture. People
affected when water is transferred out of a basin range from farm workers to
fertilizer sales and pesticide application industries. Well levels, public health, and
basic access to clean water may also be impacted while reduced tax revenues can
further squeeze public services. The consequences of decisions to transfer water
clearly have public dimensions that are currently being negotiated.7'
While in most purely economic contexts the public is surer about the division
of public and private benefits, the context of water still raises fundamental
questions that resonate with large sectors of the public. One such question is
posed when one considers that "[a]ll water within the State is the property of the
people of the State,' 72 and increasing prices are being offered to farmers by urban
water suppliers: How much of that increased price belongs to the water rights
holder and how much should actually go to the public, especially when the
infrastructure to move the water was built at public expense? When does the
seller of a private water right begin to traffic on the value of an inherently public
asset? The easy answer offered by most legal professionals involved in such
transactions, that it all goes to the water rights holder, is coming under increasing
social scrutiny by many present inhabitants of the state who were simply not
represented at the time of "the Great Barbeque," or the many incremental
occasions since, when public assets have passed to private control. We now have
separate markets for agricultural and urban water and the resolution of price
differentials cannot be achieved so simplistically.73 Gains, made by moving an
inherently public asset between the two markets, cannot be privatized by mere
desire. Yet that is what seems to be happening by degrees in California. Holmes
was very deliberate in maintaining a zone of structural uncertainty when he wrote
about state powers with regard to natural resources, stating:
[T]he constitutional power of the State to insist that its natural
advantages shall remain unimpaired by its citizens is not dependent on
any nice estimate of the extent of present use or speculation as to future
needs. The legal conception of the necessary is apt to be confined to
somewhat rudimentary wants, and there are benefits from a great river
that might escape a lawyer's view. But the State is not required to submit
even to an aesthetic analysis. Any analysis may be inadequate. It finds
itself in possession of what all admit to be great public good, and what it
has it may keep and give no one a reason for its will.
74
71. See, e.g., S.B. 1374, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (as introduced on February 18, 2004, but not enacted, by
Senator Machado to regulate certain proposed transfers that might involve third party impacts).
72. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 2004).
73. See, e.g., longstanding negotiations involved in the Imperial Irrigation District-San Diego transfer
and current negotiations concerning compensation for "third parties."
74. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908).
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Public accommodation can only emerge with the involvement of a broader
cross section of the public in particular policy situations. This is beginning to
happen as California water planners are finding that private negotiations behind
closed doors are not automatically approved by an informed public. The decision
in the Planning & Conservation League75 case noted above is a key reminder of
this.
The rise of an environmental justice movement is another indication of the
changing demographic and socio-political landscape in California. Ethnic and
low-income communities suffer disproportionately when subsistence fisheries are
contaminated by toxic chemicals or damaged due to hydropower facilities'
operations. These communities frequently do not have the disposable income
needed to substitute other foods or travel to safer waters. Heavy metals and many
other toxic contaminants tend to accumulate in the tissues of fish higher on the
food chain and pose higher risks to people who eat them most frequently, as is
the case with many racial and ethnic communities located near polluted
California waters. Fishing access and use in California waters is explicitly
protected by the California Constitution in the Declaration of Rights.7 6 The issue
is made more complex since fishing is one of the traditional public uses protected
by the common law public trust doctrine. The failure of the State to maintain its
trust resources in a suitable condition for such a long-established trust use is a
serious problem that environmental justice advocates have begun to notice.
California's duty with regard to public fisheries is clearly greater than a simple
obligation to warn people in different languages that they are endangering their
personal health and safety when using trust waters for intended purposes. But just
how much this duty will be enforced when polluting industries are accustomed to
treating waterways as free waste disposal services is a point of ongoing
negotiation.77 Traditional trust obligations to maintain resources in condition
suitable for trust uses are owed to all Californians, regardless of their political or
economic power. In fact, one of California's primary trustee agencies, the
California State Lands Commission, has explicitly recognized environmental
justice duties as consistent with its original trust obligations. 8
It is by now abundantly clear in California that existing water management
practices are impinging on public interests in the resource, and that these
situations cannot be regulated or remedied solely by protecting or enforcing
private rights and duties, though that sometimes appears to be the ideological
commitment of some private actors and courts that have recently evaluated recent
controversies. 79 The often convoluted reasoning and tortured descriptions of
75. 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 173 (Ct. App. 2000).
76. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 25.
77. See, e.g., Clean Estuary Partnership negotiation of new Total Maximum Daily Loads for San
Francisco Bay under the leadership of the Regional Water Quality Control Board.
78. See CAL. STATE LANDS COMM'N, supra note 70.
79. See, e.g., Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001) (finding a
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history that have been offered to justify judicial decrees asserting certainty in
property rights in water are becoming harder to explain to a public that is most
often looking for a basically reasonable story to support judicial problem solving.
Just how long these judgments that fly in the face of fair treatment for all
Californians will be tolerated is an open question. It might be relevant to recall
some of the social strife following the Dred Scott decision, 80 probably one of
history's more ill-advised forays introducing judicially imposed certainty in
socially contested property rights.
The government's credibility is further strained in the California water rights
context by the manner in which scientific authority is sometimes claimed when
resolving questions involving common property resources such as water. A
recent issue of Science devoted a special section to a modem look at the
"Tragedy of the Commons" essay by Garrett Hardin that was first published on
its pages thirty-five years earlier. The original essay posited an inherent
tendency for humans to undermine the ecological basis of any commonly held
resource since they would obviously take actions at all times maximizing short
term private benefit, even when it could be clearly seen that collective welfare
was being harmed.82 The main consequence of Hardin's analysis was that an
entire academic and political orthodoxy was spawned claiming that ownership of
valuable resources should not be shared, but rather had to be assigned to a single
agent to prevent the inevitable tragedy that would result otherwise. In the new
retrospective, anthropologists and scientists from various disciplines recognized a
myriad of institutional mechanisms that have historically been implemented by
any number of cultures to avert exactly this type of "tragedy." One sentiment
expressed in one of the major pieces that formed the special section was that:
Effective governance requires not only factual information about the state of
the environment and human actions but also information about uncertainty
and values. Scientific understanding of coupled human-biophysical systems
will always be uncertain because of inherent unpredictability in the systems
and because the science is never complete. 83
This statement summarizes some of the main concerns about premature
quantification and imposition of certainty in water right systems. The Science
analysis also pointed to governance challenges posed when social consequences
and physical impacts of public policies are not perceived at the levels where the
regulatory taking without undertaking the required inquiry to establish an underlying property right); see Gray,
supra note 31, at 4-15.
80. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856) (recognizing slaves as chattel in all
states, "altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior
that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect").
81. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
82. Id.
83. Thomas Dietz et al., The Struggle to Govern the Commons, 302 SCIENCE 1907, 1908 (2003).
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policies are proposed or consent is given. 84 This is especially true of negative
environmental impacts induced by incentives created in various international
trade agreements. Resource damage and labor exploitation often occur on both
geographic and temporal scales far removed from the experiences or jurisdictions
of the parties who propose or receive benefits from the policies. The basic
conclusion was that there is a need to make a transition from an "adaptive
management" form of regulation to an "adaptive governance" framework to
encompass more of the parties externalized by arbitrarily imposed political and
economic boundaries.85 The authors felt that improved governance is particularly
needed in cases where there is a tendency for powerful actors to "game" any
system of regulation.
86
Adaptive governance has been the historic province of the public trust
doctrine for as long as its constituent inquiries have been invoked in crisis
situations to re-establish new, or at least slightly more sustainable, balances
between people and the resource systems that support them.87 The history of
progress here involves legal and political action at all levels. Positions adopted in
trial courts cannot be underestimated in this arena because rulings that have not
been appealed have always played a large role in shaping action on the ground.
Indeed, all the public interest limitations that shape the enforcement of private
claims in water serve to establish institutional signposts that can aid in finding
practicable accommodations to uncertainties encountered in marginal zones.
VI. THE EMERGING HAWAI'IAN APPROACH -A POSSIBLE
CALIFORNIA FUTURE?
In August of 2000, the Hawai'ian Supreme Court forged a framework for a
socially inclusive future where that state will recognize its primary responsibility to
maintain an ecologically viable water resource system.8 8 The opportunity for a
comprehensive reappraisal of history and endorsement of a public trust framework
for adaptation toward a more sustainable future came with the closing of a major
sugar growing and processing operation on the island of Oahu in the early 1990s.
89
Prior to closing, water, to the tune of about twenty-seven million gallons a day, in
addition to drafts from the Pearl Harbor aquifer, was imported from streams and




87. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (recognizing affirmative State duty
to protect trust resources whenever feasible); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000)
[hereinafter Waidhole Ditch] (recognizing primary State duty to preserve and protect trust resources whenever
feasible); see, e.g., Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821) (establishing order in the public oyster fishery by
recognizing a right to public access).
88. Waidhole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409.
89. Id. at 423.
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operation. 90 After its closing, the sugar business would not need the water so the
question of how it would be reallocated became a controversy when several parties
questioned the permit applications for current and new uses.91 At about the same
time the closure of the sugar business was announced in 1993, applications were also
made to increase the amount of water reserved for instream uses on the windward
side of the island and it became obvious that less than perfect knowledge existed
about either the human or natural systems' needs or capacities.92 A broader public
inquiry was clearly demanded, and since the public saw the harm caused to trust
resources due to inadequate historic supervision of private conduct, the court
recognized a need for precaution when dealing with these inherently public resources.
A long history of community activism and continuing media attention
created a fertile environment for public deliberation. As in so many other cases
concerned with finding a resolution based in the "public interest," questions were
raised about inherently conflicting roles of public representatives, ranging from
Commissioners in dual roles to the Attorney General herself representing state
agencies with conflicting mandates.93 But after all the elements of procedural due
process were settled, the court went on to recognize a practicable set of
principles, drawing from the common law public trust doctrine and Hawai'i's
unique constitutional history to set out important guideposts for finding a viable
solution to the problem at hand.
The court emphasized the traditional Hawai'ian notion that the King held all
resources in trust for his subjects and that since the cession of sovereignty was not
the outcome of a conquest, but rather an agreement, portions of title passed to the
new state with these traditional attributes.94 Of course, most of the traditional
attributes of title were explicitly articulated in the State's constitution and its resource
codes as well.9 The merger of constitutional history with the many similar strands of
concern in the development of other states' common law public trust doctrines led to
the recognition of a comprehensively developed set of principles that could be
applied to reach responsible decisions. The trust obligations were firmly fixed on a
constitutional level.96 Both ground and surface water were recognized as aspects of
the same State resources trust.97 Traditional uses of water by native Hawai'ians were
recognized as protected by the public trust.98 The State was seen as having a primary
duty to preserve and protect the ecological basis of its water resources system and the
90. Id.
91. Id. at 423-24. In 1992, the Water Commission had designated five windward stream aquifers as
ground water management areas requiring new and existing diverters to apply for permits within one year. Id. at
423; see HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 174C-41 to 174C-63 (1993 & Supp. 1999) (regulating water use).
92. Waidhole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 423.
93. Id. at 432-39.
94. Id. at 440-41.
95. Id. at 441-42.
96. See id.
97. Id. at 447.
98. Id. at 449.
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precautionary principle was explicitly found to be a restatement of the State's pre-
existing public trust obligations to its present and future inhabitants:
[A]t minimum, the absence of firm scientific proof should not tie the
Commission's hands in adopting reasonable measures designed to further
the public interest. So defined, the precautionary principle simply restates
the Commission's duties under the constitution and Code. Indeed, the lack
of full scientific certainty does not extinguish the presumption in favor of
public trust purposes or vitiate the Commission's affirmative duty to protect
such purposes wherever feasible. 99
In essence, the court acknowledged the need to function within, and not be
paralyzed by, uncertainty at multiple levels. While scientific uncertainty is analyzed
on different scales and dimensions when compared to legal uncertainty concerning
property rights, it has many common features and institutional responses are often
analogous in the two areas. In dealing with a concrete case on the margin where
contested claims were being asserted, the Hawai'ian Supreme Court found it useful
to reappraise how the State had reached its present situation and how various rights
had been recognized in the State's water resources. The solution was essentially to
resurrect the public spaces inherent in our legal traditions, in a manner very similar to
the approach taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hudson County in 1908 when it put
an end to plans to export water from New Jersey to New York. 1°
In describing its decision, the majority of the Hawai'ian Supreme Court
signed onto the notion that historic public obligations can no longer be
disregarded in planning and supervising the use of one of our most important
public resources stating:
[W]e do not establish any "priorities" as that notion is commonly understood
in water law and has been previously eschewed by the legislature. Rather,
we simply reaffirm the basic, modest principle that use of the precious water
resources of our state must ultimately proceed with due regard for certain
enduring public rights. This principle runs as a common thread through the
constitution, Code, and common law of our state. Inattention to this principle
may have brought short-term convenience to some in the past. But the
constitutional framers and legislature understood, and others concerned
about the proper functioning of our democratic system and the continued
vitality of our island environment and community may also appreciate, that
we can ill afford to continue down this garden path this late in the day. 101
99. Id. at 467.
100. See Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
101. Waidhole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 502 n.108.
2005 / Toward Greater Certainty in Water Rights?
The State of Hawai'i thus made the decision that it was well past time to
recognize some of the principles and priorities that had proven so easy to ignore
in the daily business of economic life. The Hawai'ian Supreme Court renewed
the network of responsibilities and obligations that are inherent in the public trust
doctrine so that the state could credibly deal with situations that had gotten out of
balance. The same trajectory could clearly develop in California, where our own
Supreme Court provided some of the key precedents relied upon by the
Hawai'ian court to shape its decision.
While Hawai'ian decisions are not binding law in California, the implications
are obvious. The gracious leadership that is emerging in Hawai'i should be a
strong wake-up call that an increasingly engaged California public will probably
soon be calling for its own trustees to do a better job of protecting this state's
precious natural resources. The Hawai'ian choice was to move forward and
engage scientific and legal uncertainty within a framework of public precaution.
Longstanding habits in the California water world, such as closed door meetings
to craft policies with broad public impacts, are simply not appropriate for making
decisions about how to allocate one of our most precious public resources.
This "late in the day," as the Hawai'ian court put it, it is no longer
appropriate to "continue down the garden path" of proceeding by assumption or
simply failing to make inquiries required by law. 10 2 The duties imposed on public
trustees by the California public trust doctrine serve as an excellent series of
guideposts to identify the zones where more attention is needed to perceive and
address the scientific and legal uncertainties inherent in our current water rights
system. Just as in Hawai'i, California's trustees have a continuing duty to
supervise public trust resources and ensure that they are used in a manner
consistent with trust purposes. This supervisory duty is combined with an
affirmative obligation to exercise discretion in such a manner as to protect trust
resources whenever feasible.
Perhaps more than any other obligation arising from public trusteeship, these
are the two that should give greatest pause to those proposing streamlined
processes for water transfers. The transfer of water or water rights to new uses is
the essence of a historical "marginal zone" where "uncertainty" is most needed to
provide the public space to protect future options. Yet these are exactly the cases
where water transfer proponents are clambering for more "certainty" in their
rights and less responsibility for researching and recording information about the
economic and environmental impacts of their actions. The duty of state
supervision necessarily implies the capacity for supervision, and this is exactly
what is being surrendered in many of the models being proposed to regulate this
area. This creates a dilemma for public trustees and regulatory agencies: if they
give in to political demands for more "certainty" for private water right holders
and less accountability, and basically continue to ignore their public duties, the
102. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 31, at 4-15.
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larger water regulation system drifts toward ecological and social brittleness and
the trustees breach their public obligations of continuous and meaningful
supervision.
The Hawai'ian experience indicates that times do arrive when it is essential
to acknowledge public values and interests in the service of long-term social
welfare. Happily, with the time-tested principles of the public trust doctrine as a
guide, the balance sought in "uncertain" zones is not simply an entirely relative
one where everybody is equally unhappy; rather it resides within ecological and
social limits that must be reasonably described within a framework of public
precaution. Our legal institutions do indeed require a tolerable amount of
"uncertainty" to make room for public deliberation and successful adaptation to
changed circumstances. We should not inadvertently eliminate this in a
generalized quest to achieve greater certainty in water rights. That would actually
lead to a more brittle system, increasingly vulnerable to both social and
ecological stresses. Perhaps these observations can help put some of the mixed
results of the Governor's Commission in a broader context and offer still another
perspective for future policy development.

